The Life, Death, and Resurrection of Religious America and its Establishments
“America’s core culture has been and, at the moment, is still primarily the culture of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century settlers who founded American society. The central elements of that culture can be defined in a variety of ways but include the Christian religion, Protestant values and moralism, a work ethic, the English language, British traditions of law, justice, and the limits of government power, and a legacy of European art, literature, philosophy, and music.”
— Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? (2004)
With the anniversary of 9/11 once again behind us, it is illuminating to reexamine the destructive effect of that day on the American psyche. The general mood was less a fear of death than of disintegration. The Bush Administration’s official line was that the terrorists hated our freedoms and wanted to destroy our way of life. The strangeness of that framing was already acute at the time: not only divorced from the expressed aims of the terrorists, but also apparently from reality. How could two-dozen jihadis destroy our way of life? Yet was this not what occurred?
The physical carnage of 9/11 was less significant than the political crisis it catalyzed. There were two different paradoxes involved in the attacks and the wars that followed: first, that the modern technology and neoliberal political economy which defined American global power encouraged a globalization of culture that hollowed out the American ‘way of life’ this power was supposedly protecting. Second, that what initially seemed like a war between religion and neoliberalism, or “Jihad vs. McWorld” turned out to be the pyrrhic victory of the latter. The Ummah could survive Western armies, but not Western consumerism, and neither could we.
Both Western and Muslim cultures today reflect the spiritual poverty of materialism. The figure of the mujaheed is still out there but less as the authentic expression of traditional religiosity and more as a snarling insecurity in the vortex of the erosion of collective identity wrought by ubiquitous liberal modernity.
That liberal modernity was both a product of America and bound up with the US as a revolutionary Protestant project. As Samuel Huntington noted, the country was born from a cacophony of sects united primarily by suspicious hostility to central authority. There were violent Presbyterian Scots-Irish borderers, urban Philadelphia Quakers, and sundry others including my own Mennonite ancestors from the Rhineland, the Palatine boors hated by Benjamin Franklin. But the most significant were the Anglican (later Episcopalian) settlers of the Virginia Tidewater and the Puritans of New England. The former contributed a genteel, elitist, and patronizing quality, while the latter supplied a violent millenarianism that manifested in both an ethos of dominance and psychological insecurity.
American liberalism is both the political expression of Protestantism and the mechanism that made it possible. Without a state that was formally tolerant of religious differences, there could have been no union. But there would have been no need for tolerance were there not for the presence of confessional differences to begin with.
For the first seven decades of America’s existence there was no ‘Protestant establishment’ as such — there were regional religious hierarchies and networks in complex contestation with populist movements like Methodism and intellectual variants like Unitarianism. But the general tenor of American Protestantism, irrespective of its specific creedal expression, was a liberal ethos of progress and mastery of nature.
The various segments of Protestant America could act most effectively when their energies were collectively directed outward. The supreme example was Manifest Destiny, that expansive imperial project that began as soon as the liberal Protestant coalition of states saw off its final existential challenge in 1815. Throughout the early 19th century it spread from coast to coast, crushing all manifestations of illiberal life in its path. The heathen natives of the interior and the Spanish Catholics in Mexico fell before the juggernaut before the enterprise collapsed into Civil War.
America’s descent into interregional violence was the consequence of two critical flaws in the liberal religious order: the persistence of an illiberal social order based around slavery in the South, and the psychosocial dynamic of purity spirals in the Unitarians of New England. The quasi-theological mission of the Union Army to destroy the last vestiges of pre-capitalist oppression would be given official sanction by the martyrdom of President Lincoln.
Lincoln was the herald and sigil of a new kind of American Protestant establishment that would come into being after the war: the WASPs. Less concerned with Biblical doctrine directly than with harnessing Christian sentiments in order to advance social change, both at home and abroad, the WASPS were driven by a need to impose certainties in assuaging inner doubt and finding a sense of purpose.
The WASPs lead America through its Golden Age, the Bull Moose period of the pre-WWI years, the Return to Normalcy of the 1920s, the New Deal, WWII, and the boom of the 1950s. The WASP lifestyle wasn’t universal: other Americans were always around. But it was politically dominant and culturally aspirational.
Increasing American power throughout the nineteenth century supplied its WASP ruling elite with prestige and cache. The Catholic Church, which in Europe declared liberalism a heresy, slyly eased off its polemics in the US. Catholics could move into the mainstream of American life, particularly after the end of the Second World War, so long as their conduct obeyed Protestant norms. The election of John F. Kennedy as President in 1960, after having first given public assurances that he would never defer to his church in decision-making, was a case in point.
In 1960 it still looked like the Protestant establishment would be the permanent ruling elite at the top of American life. But it wasn’t to be. Liberalism was both the solution and prerequisite for the existence of Protestant pluralism, which not only sanctions, but compels the privatization of belief; to keep the peace, one must have no right to compel others in matters of conscience. But at the same time, liberalism as an ideological project demands collective adherence to shared norms ultimately rooted in religious assumptions.
In short, liberalism demands the privatization of belief, but public action on the basis of shared common commitments that presuppose existing beliefs as normative. While the ruling elite and the population below them shared the same inherited religious norms it was possible to make this work, but the very success of the liberal project led those in charge to forget that. In order to work, liberalism ultimately had to be rooted in pre-liberal customs. Instead, and especially after WWII, it came to be taken for granted that liberalism was a kind of human default, with foreigners abroad and at home awaiting an American-fostered political redemption untethered to any people’s existing historical conditions.
These sensibilities would prove unsustainable as American society became increasingly diverse and atomized. The civil rights regime that began to replace the Reconstruction settlement of regional political norms in the 1950s, together with the mass immigration that first began picking up steam following reforms in the 1960s produced a society in which the cultural substrate required to maintain Liberal traditions organically was no longer present. In the meantime, the descendants of the Puritans, now ensconced in universities, the media, and government agencies reconceived the relationship between Christianity and liberalism to the point of apotheosizing the Protestant work ethic into a universalist managerial science. Although far removed from the Bible, certain sentiments lingered like a spark from the ashes of the once formidable Protestant regime: it was the last act of the WASP establishment before its downfall.
The political and religious ramifications of the collapse of the WASPs are among the most significant facts of modern American life. Mainline Protestant churches have all acceded to the merger of Christianity and liberalism called modern progressivism, and are dying, while more conservative forms of Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy committed to anti-liberal understandings of the relationships between Church, state, and life are resurgent. Novel doctrines of Synergia and Integralism offer models of critique against the decaying existing order while Evangelicals are exploring Christian Nationalism.
The collapse of the Bush dynasty supplies a kind of microcosm of this phenomenon, worthy of a book by Thomas Mann. George Herbert Walker Bush was an archetypal Episcopalian WASP patrician and the last example of his kind who could run for President and hope to win. His ersatz Texan son George W. Bush converted to the more relatable Methodism of his adopted neighbors, and spent two terms bombing Evangelically-tinged Neoconservativism into the Middle East and importing cheap labor into America. Partly as a consequence, his younger brother, who had become a liberal-minded Hispaniform Catholic, was crushed among Christian voters by a secular New York real estate developer and TV star who campaigned on rejecting liberal Protestantism, in all its forms.
¡Jeb! marked the whimpering end of the Protestant establishment. As a candidate, he symbolized an abstracted, politicized faith serving as cover for a policy that robbed men of their power and agency, stripped communities of their culture, and atomized and alienated men from the bonds of fellowship.
Two decades of the War on Terror, the Financial Crisis of 2008, and multiple other defeats and calamities had woken American Christians up to the possibility that other recent innovations in American life might not be so great after all: the civil rights regime, feminism, mass immigration, globalism, etc. But since those things, which were expressions of liberalism, could not be effectively critiqued from within liberalism, it was necessary to set up camp on different foundations. More traditional forms of Christianity are on the rise in America because they supply these foundations: forms of thought and belief through which modernity can be approached that are not themselves its children.
Al-Qaeda did not threaten our freedom or way of life on 9/11, but merely spectacularly manifested the same inner tensions that lay under the surface in our own society: the terrorism of meaninglessness in the face of modernity. But whereas Salafism is doomed by its parasitism, Christian traditionalism in the West can emerge as an organic and vital force committed to the rebuilding of what once was by turning away from the past and embracing the future.
Trump’s running mate in 2016 was Mike Pence, an Evangelical Neocon. His current partner is JD Vance, 40, a Catholic equally at home with reactionary rightism and technological futurism. Vance represents the beginning of a new sort of establishment, less comprehensive, more regional and eclectic, and archaeo-traditional in outlook: a faith far closer to the frontier Protestant spirit that characterized America in its origins than the Protestant spirit it came to assume. Perhaps this return can inject new vitality into a religious and political culture that has grown stagnant, moribund, and indeed hostile to the civilizational values that created it. Ironically we might now be witnessing the return of the phenomenon that shaped Protestantism from the very beginning: reformation.
